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1 Introduction
In the Kyle [8] model of informed trading in a financial market a risk neutral
insider, who receives private information about the payoff of a risky asset, and
noise traders submit order quantities to risk neutral market makers, who set
prices competitively. An equilibrium in the Kyle model is characterized by the
conditions that the price of the asset is equal to its expected value conditional
on the information contained in the order flow, and that the insider chooses his
quantity optimally as a function of his information, given the dependence of
price on order flow.
Kyle’s paper and most of the subsequent literature building on his model (see
O’Hara [10] for a survey) impose normality of the distribution of the exogenous
random variables and investigate equilibria in which price is a linear function of
order flow. Such linear equilibria exist under the normality assumption. They
are attractive because of their tractability and have been used as a versatile
tool to analyze how changes in the environment affect financial market equilib-
rium under asymmetric information and, in particular, to analyze an informed
trader’s ability to profit from his private information.
In this paper we identify simple additional conditions under which normality
is not only sufficient but also necessary for the existence of linear equilibria in
the Kyle model. We do so in a version of the Kyle model in which there is a
single round of trading and N informed traders. We assume that noise trading
and the asset payoff (the information of an insider) are stochastically indepen-
dent and have finite second moments, but impose no additional restrictions on
the distributions of these random variables. For given distributions of asset
payoff and noise trade satisfying these assumptions, we prove that the existence
of a linear equilibrium for two different numbers of informed traders implies
that the underlying random variables are normally distributed. A similar, but
weaker characterization of the normal distribution was obtained independently
by Bagnoli, Viswanathan and Holden [2, Theorem 5]. Besides our distributional
assumptions Bagnoli, Viswanathan and Holden impose and make substantial use
of a technical condition on the characteristic functions of the relevant random
variables and then show that the existence of a linear equilibrium for all N
implies normality.
The assumptions which yield our characterization of the normal distribution
are tight in the sense that (i) there are non-normal distributions with finite
second moments, but violating the independence assumption, such that linear
equilibria exist for allN (Foster and Viswanathan [6]), (ii) there are distributions
with infinite second moments, satisfying the independence assumption, such
that linear equilibria exist for all N (Bagnoli, Viswanathan and Holden [2]),
and (iii) for any given N there exist independent, non-normal distributions
for asset payoff and noise trading with finite second moments such that linear
equilibria exist (Bagnoli, Viswanathan and Holden [2]; for the case N = 1 see
Pagano and Ro¨ell [11, Proposition 3]).
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2 The Model
The model follows the single auction setting considered in Kyle [8, Section 2],
but allows for multiple informed traders as in Holden and Subrahmanyan [7] and
Foster and Viswanathan [6]. There are three types of traders: noise traders, risk
neutral market makers, and N ≥ 1 risk neutral informed traders (the insiders).
The aggregate quantity traded by noise traders and the payoff of the risky asset
are given by exogeneous random variables.1 Noise trading is denoted by u˜. The
payoff of the risky asset is denoted by v˜. In contrast to Kyle we do not impose
normality on the joint distribution of u˜ and v˜. We do however maintain his
independence assumption and assume that noise trade and payoff of the risky
asset have strictly positive, finite second moments. No further distributional
assumptions (e.g., existence of a density) are made.
The realization of v˜, but not of u˜, is observed by all insiders, who then
simultaneously decide on the market order they submit. A strategy for insider
n is given by a Lebesgue measurable function Xn : IR → IR, determining his
market order as a function of the observed payoff. For a given strategy Xn, let
x˜n = Xn(v˜). A strategy combination (X1, . . . , XN ) determines the order flow
as y˜ =
∑
n x˜n + u˜.
Market makers observe the realization of the order flow, but not any of its
components, and engage in a competitive auction to serve the order flow. The
outcome of this competition is described by a Lebesgue measurable function
P : IR→ IR, called the pricing rule. Given (P,X1, . . . , XN ) define p˜ = P (y˜) and
let p˜in = (v˜−p˜)x˜n denote the resulting trading profit of insider n. To ensure that
the expected profit of an insider is well-defined for all feasible (P,X1, . . . , XN ),
we restrict the strategy set of an insider to X = {Xn | E[x˜2n] <∞}, and the set
of pricing rules to P = {P | ∀(X1, . . . , XN ) ∈ XN : E[p˜2] <∞}.
The equilibrium conditions are that the competition between market makers
drives their expected profits to zero conditional on the order flow and that each
insider chooses his trading strategy to maximize his expected profits. Following
the convention in the existing literature, an equilibrium is said to be linear if
the pricing rule is an affine function of the order flow.
Definition 1 (P,X1, . . . , XN ) ∈ XN×P is an equilibrium for the model (u˜, v˜, N)
if
E[v˜ − p˜ | y˜] = 0 (1)
and, for all n and x ∈ X ,
E[p˜in] ≥ E[(v˜ − P (
∑
m6=n
x˜m +X(v˜) + u˜))X(v˜)]. (2)
An equilibrium is linear if there exist constants µ, λ such that
∀y : P (y) = µ+ λy.
1As it is customary we omit the explicit reference to the underlying probability space and
identify random variables that coincide with probability one.
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We refer to (p˜, x˜1, . . . , x˜N ) as an equilibrium outcome of the model (u˜, v˜, N)
if there exists an equilibrium (P,X1, . . . , XN ) for this model such that p˜ = P (y˜)
and x˜n = Xn(v˜) for all n.
3 Results
Before we proceed to the study of linear equilibria it is convenient to note the
following result, which generalizes some familiar comparative statics properties
for the linear equilibria in the model with normally distributed (u˜, v˜) to arbitrary
equilibria and distributions.
Lemma 1 Let (p˜, x˜1, · · · , x˜N ) be an equilibrium outcome for the model (u˜, v˜, N)
and (a, b, c, d) be constants with b, d > 0. Then (pˆ, xˆ1, ·xˆN ) is an equilibrium
outcome for the model (uˆ, vˆ, N), where uˆ = a+ bu˜, vˆ = c+ dv˜, pˆ = c+ dp˜ and
xˆn = bx˜n.
Proof: Let (P,X1, · · · , XN ) be an equilibrium in the model (u˜, v˜, N) result-
ing in the outcome (p˜, x˜1, · · · , x˜N ). Define (Pˆ , Xˆ1, · · · , XˆN ) by setting Pˆ (v) =
c + dP ((y − a)/b) and Xˆn(v) = bXn((v − c)/d). Then Xˆn(vˆ) = Xˆn(c + dv˜) =
bx˜n = xˆn and Pˆ (yˆ) = Pˆ (a + by˜) = c + dp˜ = pˆ, where yˆ =
∑
n xˆn + uˆ, show-
ing that (Pˆ , Xˆ1, · · · , XˆN ) results in the outcome (pˆ, xˆ1, · · · , xˆN ) in the model
(uˆ, vˆ, N). Because E[vˆ − pˆ | yˆ] = dE[v˜ − p˜ | y˜] = 0, (Pˆ , Xˆ1, · · · , XˆN ) satisfies
equilibrium condition (1) in the model (uˆ, vˆ, N). Let Xˆ be any strategy in the
model (uˆ, vˆ, N). Because pˆin = (vˆ − pˆ)xˆn = bdp˜in and X(v) = Xˆ(c + dv)/b is a
strategy in the model (u˜, v˜, N), we have
E[pˆin] = bdE[p˜in] ≥
bdE[(v˜ − P (
∑
m6=n
x˜m +X(v˜) + u˜))X(v˜)] =
E[vˆ − Pˆ (
∑
m6=n
xˆm + Xˆ(vˆ) + uˆ))Xˆ(vˆ)]
showing that condition (2) is satisfied.
In particular, as in Kyle [8], changes in the standard deviation of noise trading
or the asset payoff (modeled as a linear rescaling of the underlying distributions
and corresponding to b and d in the statement of the lemma) affect equilibrium
behavior as follows. An increase in the standard deviation of noise trading
results in a proportional increase in the standard deviations of the insiders’
orders without affecting the distribution of the equilibrium price. An increase
in the standard deviation of the asset payoff does not affect the distribution
of the insiders’ orders, but results in a proportional increase in the standard
deviation of the equilibrium price. Taken together these two properties imply
that the insiders’ profits are proportional to the standard deviation of both noise
trade and the asset payoff: pˆin = (vˆ − pˆ)xˆn = bdx˜n.
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From Lemma 1 it is without further loss of generality to restrict attention
to distributions with expectation zero and unit variance in the following result,
providing a simple necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of linear
equilibria.
Lemma 2 Suppose u˜ and v˜ satisfy E[u˜] = E[v˜] = 0 and V ar[u˜] = V ar[v˜] = 1.
Then a linear equilibrium in the model (u˜, v˜, N) exists if and only if
E[
√
Nu˜− v˜ | u˜+
√
Nv˜] = 0. (3)
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in the Appendix. The idea is the following.
Given any linear pricing rule with positive slope (nonpositive slope implies that
an insider’s maximization problem has no solution) and independence of noise
trading and payoff information, condition (2) uniquely determines the order flow
as a linear combination of u˜ and v˜. The coefficients in this linear combination
depend only on the number of informed traders and the parameters of the
price function, but not on the underlying distribution. The conditions that the
“forecast error” v˜− p˜ has expected value zero and is uncorrelated with the order
flow. both implied by the market efficiency condition (1), yield two equations,
which only depend on the number of informed traders and the parameters of
the price function. Solving these equations for µ and λ shows that in any linear
equilibrium the order flow is given by y˜ =
√
Nv˜ + u˜ whereas the equilibrium
price is given by p˜ =
√
Ny˜/(N + 1). Substituting these values into (1) yields
(3), proving necessity of this condition for the existence of a linear equilibrium.
Sufficiency is then easily verified.
To obtain our main result, we use Theorem 6.1.1. in Lukacs and Laha [9, p.
103] which asserts that for any random variables (u˜, v˜) condition (3) is satisfied
if and only if i =
√−1 denotes the imaginary unit)2
∀t ∈ R : E[(
√
Nu˜− v˜)eit(u˜+
√
Nv˜)] = 0 (4)
The proof of the following proposition shows that the only case in which condi-
tion (4) holds for two distinct values of N is the one in which u˜ and v˜ are both
normally distributed. Related characterizations of the normal distribution are
given in Bryc [4, Chapter 7].
Proposition 1 Let N1 < N2 and suppose there exist linear equilibria in the
models (u˜, v˜, N1) and (u˜, v˜, N2). Then u˜ and v˜ are normally distributed.
Proof: Let E[u˜] = E[v˜] = 0 and V ar[u˜] = V ar[v˜] = 1. Let f(t) = E[eitu˜]
and g(t) = E[eitv˜] be the characteristic functions of u˜ and v˜, respectively. From
the existence of the second moments these characteristic functions are twice
2Related results are used in Bagnoli, Viswanathan and Holden [2] to obtain an explicit
characterization of those distributions for which a linear equilibrium exists for a given number
of informed traders. Their characterization [2, Corrollary 1] requires an additional assumption
on the distribution of u˜ and v˜, namely that there is no point at which the characteristic
functions and all of its derivatives are equal to zero.
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continuously differentiable (see Billingsley [3, Section 26]). Using independence
of u˜ and v˜ (and multiplying by i), (4) implies
∀t,N = N1, N2 :
√
NE[iu˜eitu˜]E[ei
√
Ntv˜] = E[iv˜ei
√
Ntv˜]E[eitu˜],
or
∀t,N = N1, N2 :
√
Nf ′(t)g(
√
Nt) = g′(
√
Nt)f(t), (5)
where dashes indicate derivatives.
Let T be a neighborhood of zero on which f(t) and g(
√
N2t) are strictly
positive. Such a neighborhood exists because the characteristic functions satisfy
f(0) = g(0) = 1. Define F (t) = log f(t) for t ∈ T , and G(t) = log g(t) for
t/
√
N2 ∈ T . From (5) these functions satisfy
∀t ∈ T,N = N1, N2 : G′(
√
Nt) =
√
NF ′(t), (6)
implying
∀t ∈ T : G′′(
√
N1t) = F ′′(t) = G′′(
√
N2t). (7)
As G′′(t) is continuous at zero, (7) implies
∀t ∈ T : G′′(t) = G′′(αt) = G′′(α2t) = G′′(α3t) = . . . = G′′(0),
where α =
√
N1/
√
N2 < 1. Together with G(0) = 0, G′(0) = 0 and G′′(0) = −1
(where the latter two conditions follow from g′(0) = iE[v˜] = 0 and g′′(0) =
−E[v˜2] = −1), it follows that
∀t ∈ T : G(t) = − t
2
2
. (8)
Using (6) and F (0) = 0, (8) also implies that F (t) = −t2/2. Hence,
∀t ∈ T : g(t) = f(t) = e−t2/2.
Consequently, the moments of u˜ and v˜ coincide with the moments of the stan-
dard normal distribution, implying that u˜ and v˜ are normally distributed (see
Billingsley [3, Section 30]).
4 Conclusion
This note has considered the simplest version of the Kyle model in which all
traders are risk neutral, noise trading is exogenous, and there is only a single
auction. In this setting we have provided simple additional conditions under
which normality is not only sufficient but also necessary for the existence of a
linear equilibrium. In our view this result suggests that further fruitful inves-
tigations of the Kyle model should focus on the characterization of nonlinear
equilibria as in Cho and El Karoui [5], Back [1], and Rochet and Vila [12].
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 2
To show necessity, suppose (P,X1, · · · , XN ) is an equilibrium with P (y) =
µ+λy. We have λ > 0: otherwise the strategy X(v) = kv would be a profitable
deviation for every insider if k is sufficiently large.
Because Xn(v) is an equilibrium strategy,
Xn(v) ∈ arg max
x
E[v − µ− λ(
∑
m6=n
Xm(v) + u˜+ x))x | v˜ = v], v˜ − a.e. (9)
The first order condition and independence of u˜ and v˜ yield
∀n : v˜ − µ− λ(
∑
m
x˜m + x˜n) = 0.
Hence x˜n is independent of n and thus
∀n : x˜n = 1
λ(N + 1)
(v˜ − µ). (10)
Consequently, order flow and price are given by
y˜ =
N
λ(N + 1)
(v˜ − µ) + u˜, p˜ = µ+ N
N + 1
(v˜ − µ) + λu˜. (11)
The market efficiency condition (1) implies
E[v˜ − p˜] = 0, E[(v˜ − p˜)y˜] = 0. (12)
Substituting (11) into (12) yields two equations for λ and µ. Using that u˜ and
v˜ are independent and both standardized, one obtains the solution
µ = 0, λ =
√
N
N + 1
.
Substituting these equilibrium values of µ and λ back into (11) yields
y˜ =
√
Nv˜ + u˜, p˜ =
Nv˜ +
√
Nu˜
N + 1
. (13)
Hence,
E[v˜ − p˜ | y˜] = 1
N + 1
E[v˜ −
√
Nu˜ |
√
Nv˜ + u˜]. (14)
In particular, (1) implies (3).
To show sufficiency, define P (y) =
√
Ny/(N + 1) and Xn(v) = v/
√
N for all
n. The induced order flow y˜ and price p˜ satisfy (13). By (14) it follows that (3)
implies (1). It remains to verify (2). But this is immediate from the fact that
∀v : Xn(v) ∈ arg max
x
(v −
√
N
N + 1
(
∑
m6=n
Xm(v) + x))x.
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